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	 AbstrACt
The new development paradigm strongly reconfirms and redefines the importance 
of M&E because of some newly incorporated principles. First, increased value is attached to 
results-orientation, iterative learning and evidence-based policy-making. Realisation of these 
principles is conditional upon a strong and well-functioning M&E system. A second major prin-
ciple is an increased role and responsibility for the national government in elaborating and man-
aging the entire M&E system. At the same time, donors are expected to increasingly rely and 
align to national M&E systems and arrangements. So far, however, a narrowly confined ‘tech-
nocratic’ approach to M&E has been adopted, largely neglecting its institutional and political 
embeddedness. While the fact that politics are part and parcel of M&E has been acknowledged 
before in the context of projects and programmes, it seems that when moving to the secto-
ral and national level (where interests and stakeholders are multiplied) the interaction among 
‘politics’ and ‘M&E’ is disregarded.  
This paper elaborates a conceptual framework that furthers the understanding 
of the interlinkages among politics and M&E in a context of upwardly moving aid modalities. 
Bringing in case-study material from Rwanda, it argues that a narrow technocratic approach 
to M&E risks worsening political constraints and even undermines M&E’s technical soundness. 
Yet, there exist ways of escaping this downward spiral. ‘Smart’ M&E that acknowledges the in-
stitutional and political embeddedness of M&E has the leverage to stimulate public discussion, 
to bring more ‘sensitive’ issues into the bargaining area, to shift debates on a more factual basis 
and to eventually open up closed political opportunity structures. 
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	 résumé
Le nouveau paradigme du développement reconfirme et redéfinit solidement l’im-
portance du « suivi et évaluation » (S&E) à cause de certains principes nouvellement incorporés. 
Tout d’abord une valeur croissante est attachée à l’orientation vers les résultats, l’apprentissage 
interactif et la politique basée sur l’évidence empirique. La réalisation de ces principes dépend 
d’un bon et solide fonctionnement du système S&E.
Un deuxième principe majeur est le rôle croissant et la responsabilité du gouverne-
ment national dans l’élaboration et la gestion du système S&E tout entier. En même temps, les 
donateurs sont supposés à se baser et s’aligner de plus en plus sur les systèmes et les arrange-
ments nationaux de S&E. 
Jusqu’à présent ce n’est qu’une approche « technocratique » bien limitée qui a été 
adoptée, négligeant largement sa base institutionnelle et politique. Tandis que la politique fait 
partie intégrante du S&E, comme a été reconnu avant dans le contexte des projets et program-
mes, il apparaît que quand on passe au niveau sectoriel et national (où les intérêts et les stake-
holders se multiplient), l’interaction entre « politique » et « S&E » est sous-estimée. 
Cet article élabore une structure conceptuelle qui promeut la compréhension des 
liens entre ‘politique’ et ‘S&E’ dans un contexte de nouvelles modalités d’aide. L’étude du cas du 
Rwanda montre qu’une approche technocratique étroite du S&E contient le risque de détériorer 
les contraintes politiques et même de miner la solidité technique du S&E. Néanmoins, il existe 
des moyens d’échapper à cette spirale négative. Le S&E « intelligent » qui reconnaît la base 
institutionnelle et politique du S&E a la puissance de stimuler la discussion publique, de placer 
les débats sur une base plus objective et éventuellement d’ouvrir des structures politiques peu 
transparantes. 
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1.	 IntroduCtIon
Since the end of the 1990s a shift has taken place in the framework for interna-
tional development cooperation. The basic principles of the new paradigm are rooted in the 
Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) that emphasizes country ownership, long term 
and holistic vision, country-led partnership and results-orientation. They are most visibly op-
erationalised in the context of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), a policy document 
produced by the recipient country that reflects its own development priorities. The country 
ownership of the policy document is awarded high value within the new approach and it is pos-
tulated that country ownership will bear many fruits such as increased commitment and ac-
countability. PRSPs do not only deal with poverty and development in socio-economic terms, 
but include also more political topics, such as good governance. Once the PRSP is approved of, 
it provides the cornice for international donor engagement. New aid modes, such as sector and 
general budget support whereby donors support the government’s budget at sector or overall 
level, twin this PRSP approach and adherence to it by donors. The reform agenda entailed by the 
new aid paradigm is most clearly endorsed through the 2005 Paris Declaration (see http://www.
oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/monitoring). Twelve indicators that are measured nationally enable 
to monitor recipient’s and donor’s progress towards more country ownership, alignment, har-
monisation, managing for results and mutual accountability. 
The new development paradigm both confirms but also redefines the importance of 
M&E because of some of the newly incorporated principles. First, increased value is attached to 
results-orientation, iterative learning and evidence-based policy-making. Realisation of these 
basic principles is conditional upon a strong and well-functioning M&E system. Second, not only 
learning and commitment but also accountability for poverty reduction stands central in the 
PRSP enterprise. Without independent information on implementation and progress, it is im-
possible to hold those responsible accountable. A third major principle of the new paradigm is 
an increased role and responsibility for the national governments in managing the entire M&E 
system. Donors are expected to dismantle their own ‘parallel’ M&E apparatus, to increasingly 
rely on and align to national M&E arrangements and systems (OECD, 2005). This new approach 
presents challenges to all stakeholders involved: national governments, national and interna-
tional NGOs, but also to bi- and multilateral donors. 
It seems that, in response to this new approach it had been itself pushing, the in-
ternational donor community is adopting a fragmented approach to M&E. Firstly, there remains 
an over-emphasis on the input side[1] (Public Finance Management), recently coupled with an 
upsurge of donor-steered data collection on Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Secondly, 
there is a focus on technical dimensions of recipient M&E systems (quality of statistical systems, 
quality of indicators and targets (‘indicatorism’)) at the detriment of the broader institutional 
and M&E policy issues. One crucial issue that is neglected is the fact that recipient M&E takes 
place in a socio-political and economic context in which different stakeholders have differing 
– at times even competing - interests. This is being reinforced by what some critics highlight 
as “the conception of the PRS approach as being based upon an unwarranted faith in a tech-
nocratic, depoliticised mode of governance” (Driscoll and Evans, 2005: 12 based on Craig and 
Porter, 2003). 
[1]	 This	was	noted	earlier	by	Bamberger	(1989,	2000),	Picciotto	(2003),	World	Bank	(OED)(2002).
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The overall socio-political and economic context determines the power relations 
between (and within) the parties and institutions involved. Both power relations and interests 
influence key evaluation issues. The fact that politics are part and parcel of M&E has been ac-
knowledged long before in the context of project and programme evaluation. Politics are present 
in project and programme evaluation in different ways and this deserves to be recognised (Weiss, 
1970, 1987; Palumbo, 1987). First, evaluations are supposed to feed into decision-making and 
reports necessarily enter the political arena[2]. Second, evaluations implicitly make political 
statements about legitimacy, utility and appropriateness of programmes or projects. Third, 
since projects or programmes are creatures of political decisions that remain subject to pres-
sures during implementation, politics are inevitable during evaluation (Weiss, 1970). Evalua-
tions can thus be used, ordered or directed for the express purpose of building a certain image 
of a programme or project (Palumbo, 1987). The third relationship between politics and evalu-
ation is - potentially - the most negative one, when inspired by interests that may be contrary 
to genuine evaluation interests. Yet, not all political aspects of evaluation are to be understood 
negatively. For example, for utilisation-focused evaluations the usage is the driving force. Con-
sequently the evaluator is encouraged to tie the evaluation into the specific political context 
and needs of the users (Patton, 1987; Chelimsky, 1987a, 1987b; Weiss, 1999). All three aspects 
of politics and evaluation will to some extent be dealt with in this paper, but the focus will lie 
with the third aspect: the relationship between interests of different stakeholders and M&E 
policy and practice. With the broadening of the scope of programmes, Weiss (1970) indicated 
that effects of politics of evaluation will reach the national level instead of being localised under 
bounded projects. One may indeed assume that politics of evaluation are all the more present 
when moving from programmes to the sectoral and national level[3]; when stakeholders and in-
terests are multiplied. Therefore it is evident that the way in which politics influence M&E in the 
contemporary development paradigm should be high on the research agenda. 
The assessment framework developed in this paper furthers the understanding of 
the relationship between powers and interests at the national and international level and the 
overall M&E policy[4]. On the basis of case study material from Rwanda, primarily collected dur-
ing a mid-2006 field mission[5], it identifies crucial elements in the politics of M&E and argues 
that persistent exclusion and denial of the importance and presence of political issues in M&E 
eventually risks undermining both M&E’s functions of ‘accountability’ and ‘feedback & learning’. 
Yet, politics and M&E can also be mutually reinforcing as M&E can be an instrument for advanc-
ing public debate; ‘smart’ technocratic M&E approaches can help opening up of closed political 
environments. 
The assessment framework developed in section 2 will be the basis for the analysis 
of the Rwandan case in section 3. The central ideas of this paper are illustrated by it, yet they 
can be extrapolated to other settings. Section 4 discusses tangible measures that can be under-
[2]	 	Although	the	relationship	may	not	always	be	that	straightforward,	see	Weiss	(1999).
[3]	 	See	also	Killick	(2004:	5)	who	refers	to	the	suggestion	often	made	that “the potential seriousness of the tensions 
among evidence on the one hand and preferences of politicians and incentive structures to which they are responding has been 
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taken to escape the political trap and even more to ensure mutual reinforcement of M&E and 
political analysis. These measures are more widely applicable and reach far beyond the context 
of Rwanda. The main conclusions are bundled in section 5.
2.	 m&e	embedded	In	A	PolItICAl	oPPortunIty	struCture
Politics do play a role in M&E at project level where there are relatively limited in-
terests and a limited number of stakeholders (Weiss, 1970). Sector policies and national poverty 
reduction policies have higher stakes, interests and number of stakeholders. Therefore M&E of 
PRSPs is expected to be influenced at least as much by politics as M&E of projects. The logic 
of the new aid paradigm puts the partner country in the driver’s seat, also for monitoring and 
evaluation. With the national government at the wheel, national power relations and interests, 
shortly national politics, can be expected to play a very important role in all decisions that have to 
be taken for M&E. Measuring influence in decision-making processes is extremely difficult (Dahl, 
1991). In addition, not only decision-making is determined by power relations and interests, but 
also non-decision-making. Decision-making processes often remain black boxes, yet describ-
ing processes, power relations and positions of interests and stakes substantially increase the 
likelihood of unveiling their nature (Huberts and Kleinneijenhuis, 1994; Huberts, 1994). At first 
sight, the non-exact science of understanding politics stands in sharp contrast with the techni-
calities of M&E. Yet, this paper demonstrates that ‘politics’ and ‘technics’ lie often much closer 
to one another than one may think from the outset. In the following section we link a number 
of established concepts into one overarching conceptual framework. The assessment scheme 
presented in section 2.4 (table 2) helps understanding both politics as well as the relationship 
between politics and M&E. 
2.1.	 Political	Opportunity	Structure
Political Opportunity Structure (POS) (reproduced at the left-hand side of table 2) 
is a concept that has proven useful in political science. The POS refers to the political context 
in which stakeholders operate. Especially studies of interest groups have developed the notion 
and its understanding has evolved from a relatively stable to a more variable structure. Initially 
the POS was considered a static framework of institutional variables, relating to stable aspects 
of government structure such as the administrative structures or institutional entities (Tilly, 
1978; Kitschelt, 1986). The recognition that these structures could influence the position and 
power of stakeholders in society was important as it implied that a change in these external 
conditions could have important consequences for stakeholders. Changes can e.g. open or con-
versely block actions undertaken by interest groups. Later, the POS theory evolved towards a 
more dynamic model sensitive to sudden events and/or social processes. A distinction can thus 
be made between relatively more stable, durable aspects of the POS (e.g. traditions, culture and 
institutions) and its more volatile aspects (e.g. national policies, discourse, turnover of power, 
shift in election outcomes) (McAdam, 1999; Tarrow, 1994). The demarcation between stable 
and volatile aspects may however not always be that clear. For example the overall economic 
situation of a country is rather stable: Rwanda will remain a developing country for many more 
years, but economic waves can be very unpredictable. For example periods of extreme draught 
and their economic impact are rather volatile. The POS of a country is thus in continuous evolu-
tion; this means that the opportunities for action and influence of stakeholders may also change 
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continuously – depending upon how quickly or slowly the POS evolves. The evolution of stable 
and volatile aspects will depend very much upon the interests and power of the political elite. 
But the political elite is not the only one influencing the POS. Meyer and Staggenborg (1996) 
have added an interesting dimension to the POS conception. They drew attention to the fact 
that the POS, especially the more volatile aspects, are also subject to change caused by all sorts 
of stakeholders in society, such as movements, activists, interest groups etcetera. They dem-
onstrated that both movements and counter-movements can influence the POS. Consequently, 
organisations or more generally stakeholders, become components of each other’s opportunity 
structure. Changing or influencing the POS is thus not the sanctuary of the political elite, all 
actors in society co-determine the POS by defending their own interests. Of course the action 
radius of non-state actors will highly depend upon the governmental organisation and struc-
tures. But the success of non-state actors, such as civil society or the donor community, will also 
depend upon the behaviour of other non-state actors. For example, when civil society organisa-
tions strive for the emancipation of women, donor’s negligence of the issue or donor’s support 
for this cause, influences deeply the chances of success of these organisations. Non-state actors 
can thus reinforce or jeopardise each other’s causes. This is not only the case when they have 
mutual or opposed objectives in mind – such as peace organisations and guerrilla groups. Actors 
with different aims co-determine each other’s POS too. For example HIV/aids organisations can 
be given such an overwhelming attention in society that little time and money is left for associa-
tions taking up the cause of other vulnerable groups. Non-state actors will also determine the 
positioning of the political elite and the way it chooses to defend its interests. When a govern-
ment feels threatened in its existence by certain movements it may for example adopt restrain-
ing legislation, and this will influence the POS for all actors involved. This dynamic, interactionist 
conception of the POS with stable, volatile and stakeholders’ elements (McAdam et al., 1996) 
will be key to our framework. 
2.2.	 Politics	of	M&E
Only a well-functioning M&E system can uphold the principles of results-orienta-
tion, iterative learning, evidence-based policy-making and accountability. Learning and feed-
back are one set of functions of M&E. For learning to be effective (improving policy-making, but 
also more broadly feeding into broader change of opinions in society), M&E is necessarily ‘un-
comfortable’, highlighting both negative and positive experiences. 
Apart from learning, M&E also has an accountability function. When results are not 
met or policies not implemented as promised this may have implications for the politicians that 
engaged to deliver. This holding accountable is one of the cornerstones of democratic societies. 
An adequate M&E system has to provide the necessary elements to check whether promises 
were lived up to. When this is not the case, political elites can be confronted with counterfac-
tual evidence. In a next period, leaders will have to strengthen or reorient policies and their im-
plementation, or relinquish power because of their failure to deliver. It has to be clear, though, 
that M&E cannot just be about accountability. Little progress will be made with accountability 
without learning. A change in power – the strongest application of accountability – will not au-
tomatically lead to policy improvement. Learning from failures, but also from successes – what 
works and what does not – is crucial to progress. 
Those involved or subjected to M&E often experience the exercise as a punishing 
event (see e.g. Taut and Brauns, 2003), people and institutions are scared by M&E because of 
the negative implications it may have for their personal careers or the survival of their institu-
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tions. This limited, accountability-oriented perception narrows down the potential contributions 
of M&E. Whereas personal fears for accountability can be understood one would think that the 
learning aspect offers nothing but positive offspring for a government as it may only contribute 
to strengthen governmental policies. However, certain governments may not be eager to learn 
from evidence. When less is known about what works and what doesn’t, political leaders main-
tain more room for manoeuvre to pick and choose strategic decisions (see also Centre for Global 
Development, 2006). 
Whereas a well-committed government may welcome constructive learning ele-
ments, less committed governments may have an interest in shielding off information on cer-
tain policies. A sound M&E system counters this shielding off: it unveils all sorts of information, 
wanted and unwanted, beautiful and ugly. In spite of the inherent tensions between ‘political 
elites’ and ‘M&E information’, most attention in developing a water-tight M&E system goes to 
technical matters: creating a strong statistical office, installing a good data collection and man-
agement information systems, strengthening mechanisms for sound analyses, checking upon 
budgets, creating tracking systems etcetera. The hypothesis of this paper challenges the purely 
technocratic character of M&E and postulates that politics heavily intrude into M&E systems. 
Many decisions have to be taken in the development of M&E systems. Decision-making is by 
definition a political matter; therefore it is interesting to see who takes what type of decision or 
attitude in the M&E framework of a country and how they are intermingled with interests and 
power positions. Four fields of M&E decision-making are distinguished in the conceptual frame-
work reproduced below (see right-hand side of table 2); i.e. i) the institutional set-up; ii) capacity;  
iii) identification of indicators and targets and iv) feedback.   
Firstly, the institutional set-up is determined by many sub-questions such as the le-
gal M&E framework, the mandate, the flow of information, the coordination, support and central 
oversight, the place of the statistical office, the role of non-state actors and the relationship be-
tween the executive and legislative, between the line and central ministries, the central and de-
centralised levels. The second field is that of M&E capacity: are capacities present, who receives 
training, on what issues? When a lack of capacity is not remedied it has of course implications 
for the M&E system and its functioning. The third field is the one of determining indicators and 
targets: what are the type, number and quality of surveys, which indicators are chosen; what are 
the levels of disaggregation and which targets are set? Finally, deciding upon feedback of M&E 
is important for its functioning and the fulfilment of its two objectives: accountability and learn-
ing. Feedback has two dimensions, not only the distribution of M&E results is important; also its 
usage and integration deserves specific attention: what is the linkage between policy-making, 
planning, budgeting and M&E, which stakeholders do what with which results, who has access 
to what type of results, what are the barriers and the incentives to distribute and use results? 
While ideal answers can be invented for each one of these questions, each country 
has to formulate and define the grid and principles of its own system. No country has the perfect 
M&E system that may serve as a blueprint for all others. Nevertheless some basic principles 
have to be upheld in order to avoid inhibiting the system. One such important principle is inde-
pendence. Data and analysis should not be biased; if biased, they lose their function for learning 
and accountability. The institution implementing should thus not be the one evaluating; no one 
can be forced to self-incrimination. Some mechanisms can be used to increase the likelihood of 
independence, such as locating the evaluation function at a different level than the implementa-
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tion (e.g. more centralised with an immediate feedback loop to parliament) and installing ad-
ditional checks and balances (e.g. additional surveys by external actors). While these elements 
could be umbrella-ed under sound technocratic governance, our paper will demonstrate that 
technocratic and political governance are – in practice – not as neatly divided as in theory. When 
the various decisions in the four M&E fields are to be taken, politics, interests and powers, play 
a role. 
2.3.	 Stakeholders	in	Developing	Countries
Who takes the M&E decisions and what are the interests at stake? Decision taking 
is not a one dimensional enterprise; decisions often result from complex constellations in which 
many stakeholders strive for the assurance of their interests. To what degree they can influence 
decision-making or non-decision-making has to be put in perspective of the POS in which they 
operate. The number of stakeholders and thus also the POS, is different in developing countries 
and western societies. Donors and international NGO’s are important stakeholders with inter-
ests of their own in highly aid-dependent developing countries, such as Rwanda. 
In short, four categories of stakeholders can be distinguished in developing coun-
tries: i) the national authorities of the partner country with its various components (the execu-
tive, the legislative, Auditor General etcetera). These different national stakeholders may have 
discordant interests and cannot be considered as one homogeneous group; ii) national civil soci-
ety (which is not a homogeneous group either, it comprises NGOs, churches, research institutes, 
beneficiary groups etcetera); iii) the international donor community and iv) international NGOs 
(or more broadly the international civil society).  
In terms of M&E accountability and learning each of these groups has its own inter-
ests (Bamberger, 1991); the extent to which they are able to make their interests heard largely 
depends upon the POS. First, within the new development paradigm, the national government 
is put in the M&E driver’s seat. International donors are encouraged to use and support increas-
ingly the national system as developed by the national authorities. A government committed to 
poverty reduction will consequently be eager to learn about its own policies in order to improve 
future decision-making. When additionally the government is very open and strongly democrat-
ic it will encourage accountability. However, a government not committed to poverty reduction 
has an interest in shielding off the non-effectiveness or negative externalities of its policies as it 
may lead to critical questioning of the government. Authoritarian regimes are unlikely to stimu-
late the accountability aspect of M&E, this may directly jeopardise their power position[6]. In 
addition, the lack of information on the effects of policies widens their room for manoeuvre in 
deciding upon the direction of policies. The actions undertaken by governments to curtail critical 
analysis and insight may range from overt forms of repression and blunt human rights abuses 
(such as no freedom of speech and arbitrary detentions) to more covert forms. Institutions can 
be impeded to function autonomously for example by dissolution; parliamentary power can be 
curtailed; autonomous organisations (such as the Auditor General’s Office) can be captured, 
guided or infiltrated by a government agency (cooptation). At times governmental interference 
can be very subtle in the form of coordination or monitoring. It implies centralised organisa-
tional functioning which may lead to over-centralised decision-making, bureaucratic delay and 
[6]	 	As	indicated	by	Gordillo	and	Andersson	(2004:	309),	“the more dramatic the power asymmetries among actors 
– that is the more power the political elites possess relative to the power of citizens and their political opposition and other 
actors – the weaker the incentive is for such an elite to transform established M&E programmes into an instrument for more 
public sector accountability”.	
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suffocation of initiative. Parallel to this stands government monitoring of independent actors by 
due registration, compulsory reporting etcetera[7]. 
Second, civil society organisations, both national and international, are mostly 
praised because they strive for the public interest as opposed to private interests. The aims and 
goals of many organisations confirm their orientation towards the general interest. Civil society 
is helping to improve public spending by ensuring and checking to what extent the poor benefit 
from it. It has therefore both a sincere interest in learning and accountability. When national 
policies do not further the public interest of poverty reduction, M&E evidence can provide them 
with information on what could work or indicate why certain policies have not worked. This can 
guide them in their activities (learning), for example in advocating improved policies. In addition 
M&E evidence provides them with the necessary information to hold those responsible account-
able. Politicians or government personnel that cannot deliver or perform badly can consequently 
be asked to be replaced or step up performance. This accountability is especially important for 
national civil society; it contributes to the downward accountability of the government to its 
citizens. However, apart from the public interest – such as poverty reduction or the protection of 
human rights – civil society organisations have also more “private” interests such as the surviv-
al of the organisation. They will avoid organisational kamikaze. Furthermore, personal careers 
and ambitions of personnel can also play a role in organisational behaviour. 
Third, donors have their vested interests in a partner country. Given their large fi-
nancial involvement in aid-dependent countries the learning interest of donors can be expected 
to be of the same level as that of a sincerely committed government. In terms of accountability 
a distinction can be made between upward accountability and accountability to the home con-
stituency. Upward accountability is the accountability of the national recipient government to 
the donors: what is done with the different types of assistance? Depending upon the type of 
assistance, ranging from projects, to programmes, to sector support, to general budget support, 
the degree of upward accountability can differ as will be demonstrated below. In addition, do-
nor agencies can themselves be held accountable by their own constituencies for the assistance 
delivered to a particular partner country. Why are certain decisions made; how effective is aid 
delivery; what is the impact on the ground? M&E, conducted by the national government and by 
the donors (i.e. donor agencies as well as independent evaluation offices in the donor country) 
themselves, provide them with input for this process in their home countries. Upward and ‘home 
accountability’ are not necessarily smoothly reconcilable. Upward accountability puts a donor 
agency in the assessor position, while it is the assessed in ‘home accountability’. Assessing and 
being assessed may lead to schizophrenic tensions. This mix of interests, even within groups of 
stakeholders, is likely to turn technical M&E processes into true politics of M&E. 
[7]	 	Bratton	(1989)	distinguishes	among	dissolution,	cooptation,	coordination	and	monitoring.	
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Table 1.  Potentially competing M&E interests of stakeholders in developing countries
Stakeholders 
Interests





Committed to M&E in 
light of inclusive
poverty reduction 
Learning: policy improvement 
– better poverty reduction








-Open to home account-
ability
Not committed to M&E 
in light of inclusive 
poverty reduction 
Willingness to remain in power







ing donor agency’s poli-




The conceptual framework reproduced in box 2 below ties together the various 
building blocks described above. In the following sections, it will serve as guidance for the analy-
sis of the politics of M&E in the particular case of Rwanda. 
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3.	 monItorIng	And	evAluAtIon	In	rwAndA
The small land-locked country Rwanda in central Africa is most known because of 
the awful events of 1994. During the genocide an estimated number of about 800.000 Tutsi 
and moderate Hutu were slaughtered. It left the country with a dark legacy, extremely diffi-
cult to overcome. In addition to the huge loss of live, the country was left with a dysfunctional 
state apparatus, a shattered social fabric and thousand hills of trauma. Further, old problems 
of widespread poverty, population expansion, and land shortage - while agriculture constitutes 
the core of Rwandan economy - keep on haunting the country. Despite these difficulties Rwanda 
has reached macro-economic stability of which the fulfilment of IMF conditions is proof. Rwan-
da’s ruling party (RPF, Rwandese Patriotic Front) is increasingly strengthening its Public Finance 
Management (PFM) and it scores well on fighting corruption (see e.g; Amis et al., 2005: 6; Pur-
cell et al., 2006). The 1994 events had an enormous negative impact upon poverty. In 2001 
about half of Rwanda’s population was living below 1 $ a day (World Development Indicators 
Database 2006). The GDP per capita (constant 2000 US $) fell from 287 US $ in 1993 to 152 US 
$ in 1994. There was a sharp increase of GDP/capita in 1995 to a level of 209 US $ (growth rate 
of 37%), yet towards the end of the 1990s negative growth rates were again recorded (yearly 
growth rates of – 2% in 1998 and 1999). 2005 figures show a modest recovery of growth rates 
(3%) and an actual GDP/capita of 258 US $, which is still below the 1993-level (World Develop-
ment Indicators Database 2006). 
Some non-income poverty indicators hint at moderately promising improvements 
in terms of MDGs such as primary school enrolment (which stood at 73% in 2004 as compared 
to 66% in 1990), gender equality in literacy rates (97.9 % in 2004 compared to 86.4% in 1990) 
and female seats held in parliament (49% in 2004 compared to 17% in 1990) (World Develop-
ment Indicators Database 2006). In other areas (including e.g. infant and child mortality, pri-
mary school completion rates) challenges remain high (see also Republic of Rwanda and UN, 
2003). In addition concerns are increasingly raised over issues of inequality (Evans et al, 2006; 
Purcell et al., 2006).
Since the 1994 genocide many more donors began actively supporting Rwanda. 
Rwanda is highly aid-dependent with an average of 20 % aid of the GNI between 1998-2004 
(World Development Indicators Database 2006). In the immediate recovery period this was 
even substantially higher (with an average of 61% over the period 1994-1996). “Genocide 
guilt”[8] seems to have fuelled financial generosity of international donors and “it opened the 
door to aid with a political dimension” (see Purcell et al., 2006: 17). 
At the end of 2000 Rwanda’s interim PRSP was endorsed by the WB and the IMF. 
The preparation and implementation of a full PRSP was conditional to the HIPC debt relief Rwan-
da obtained. The final PRSP – tying back to the national vision called “Vision 2020” - was ap-
proved in July 2002. Since its adoption, it provides the general framework for donor assistance in 
Rwanda. The PRSP dedicates a specific section to M&E and the organisation thereof in Rwanda. 
By mid-2006, Rwanda started preparing for the second round PRSP, namely the EDPRSP (ED 
standing for Economic Development). The Rwanda Development Partners Website describes 
the entire process and announces a final EDPRS to be published by May 2007 (see http://www.
devpartners.gov.rw). However, as of December 2007 the document has not been released. 
[8]	 	In	view	of	many,	including	the	GoR,	the	genocide	was	at	least	partly	the	result	of	the	failure	of	the	international	
community	to	intervene	(UN	forces	e.g.	could	have	been	given	a	broader	mandate).		
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In addition to socio-economic problems, Rwanda had to face many political chal-
lenges. In the immediate aftermath of genocide, assistance and dealing with the genocide per-
petrators were key items on the national political agenda. The bringing to justice is still going on. 
Since 2002 the gacaca tribunals with their lay judges deal with a large part of the genocide story. 
All communities are supposed to participate in these gacaca trials. Genocide and the 1994 war 
are thus still very vividly present in the day to day life of Rwandans; so are all the related social 
frictions. In 2003 the first democratic elections were held and Kagame was elected president. 
The elections have been announced as hallmark for the end of transition (see e.g. Purcell et al., 
2006).
While the Rwandan regime scores particularly well on ‘technocratic governance’ 
such as strengthening the public finance management (PFM), fighting corruption, creating a 
functioning Tender Board etcetera, by contrast enthusiasm is to be dimmed when it concerns 
the more political issues. Therefore we refer to Rwanda as technocratically strong, yet politi-
cally weak. The governance indicators of Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005) reflected in 
the table below, illustrate this well. The six categories they define are grouped as ‘governance’, 
yet in terms of content they comprise two very different aspects of governance. ‘Government 
effectiveness’, ‘regulatory quality’ and ‘control of corruption’ go back to technical matters more 
than ‘voice and accountability’, ‘political stability’ and ‘rule of law’. While Rwanda scores good 
on the more technocratic dimensions, it scores bad on the political ones (see table below in com-
parison with the group of low income countries). The latest 2006 updates of the same indicators 
(Kaufmann et al., 2007) show a more nuanced picture with in particular a much better rating on 
‘political stability’ (from 5.3 percentile rank in 2002 to 27.4 percentile rank in 2006). Neverthe-
less, the gap among the achievements in terms of ‘technocratic governance’ and ‘political gov-
ernance’ remains. Particularly striking in this respect is Rwanda’s sharply differentiated ranking 
on ‘control of corruption’ (55.8 percentile rank) and ‘voice and accountability’ (14.4 percentile 
rank). 
Since donors tend to focus on the ‘technics’ of M&E, the weakness of a country’s 
political governance is not their major concern when talking about results, evaluation and follow 
up. Yet, in line with the framework developed above, we will demonstrate that weakness on po-
litical governance impacts directly upon M&E, its quality and usefulness. By denying this impact, 
the international donor community risks to undermine M&E in Rwanda. 
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Table 3. Governance indicators for Rwanda compared to its income group
3.1.	 M&E	Structure	under	Reform	
The 2002 PRSP initiated an institutional M&E framework and key performance 
indicators. A Poverty Observatory (PO) was installed to act as the overall coordinator of the 
system. In the mean time, the PO has been abolished and the Development and Planning Unit 
has taken over the M&E oversight. In 2005 new changes are announced by a cabinet paper (MI-
NECOFIN, 2005), which aims remedying the weak M&E institutionalisation. While the 2002 
PRSP strongly emphasised monitoring at the expense of evaluation, the Cabinet Paper aims to 
improve the tracking and analysis of progress. It developed a logical flow for an M&E framework 
linking different levels (line ministries, decentralised units) to different tasks (setting targets, 
collecting data etc.). The framework is composed as a chain, which is to be fully integrated into 
the second PRSP (EDPRSP). Four years down the PRSP road little tangible progress has been 
made in terms of institutional set-up. Again and again a new structure, format, chain or flow is 
proposed. By mid-2006, the latest changes as proposed by the 2005 Cabinet Paper have not yet 
materialised. 
Due to continuous reforms, things are never given a chance to mature, to be thought 
through practically, let alone to be implemented and tried out. The strength of a chain lies in its 
weakest link. Setting up coherent and well functioning M&E institutions has proven far from 
evident (see among others GTZ/BMZ, 2004; World Bank, 2003, 2005), even in countries where 
substantial improvements in sub-components such as statistical data capacities are made 
(World Bank, 2005). An M&E system is composed out of many actors with different responsi-
bilities: line ministries, decentralised entities, statistical offices. During different M&E stages 
100 75 50 25 0
Source: Kaufman, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruizi, M. (2005) Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters4.html
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– data collection, analysis, feedback - the need for coordination is high, but all the more problem-
atic. Subsequent changes of the institutional M&E framework are often observed. Bamberger 
(1991) reports on experiences from South Asia where due to competition among agencies to 
control M&E and fears of units becoming too powerful and threatening, institutional arrange-
ments never lasted for longer than three years. While this may not be surprising, the comprehen-
sive nature of monitoring and evaluation in the context of the PRSP requires coordination and 
oversight. For Rwanda, the logical flow of the latest proposed reform makes sense, yet more 
seems needed to effectively deal with M&E’s institutional weakness. Three elements deserve 
particular attention. First, the problematic vertical and horizontal integration; second the lack 
of institutional independence and third unclear mandates and relationships. 
Horizontal integration refers to the relationship between the central and line min-
istries. Currently, line ministries operate relatively independently and most of them do not have 
M&E (including Management Information Systems) systems in place. Where such systems are 
operational, there are no clear-cut plans about how to integrate these into an overarching M&E 
framework. Central entities, such as the Rwandan MINECOFIN, do not seem powerful enough 
to take pro-active measures aiding the set-up of sound M&E (including MIS) at line ministry 
level as well as ensuring a minimal degree of integration (see also Amis et al., 2005). The lack of 
horizontal integration is particularly problematic as it hampers central oversight and control on 
the rigorousness of data and analysis.  Usage of data for policy-making is consequently jeopard-
ised. Implementing an improved integration will need more discipline on the side of line minis-
tries (e.g. using uniform formats, establishing M&E departments), a more coercive mandate at 
central level as well as capacity building at line ministry level. 
Decentralised entities play an important role in the new M&E framework and this 
will necessitate adequate vertical integration. Statistical flows of information require rigorous 
set-ups and treatment of data, implying discipline on the supply side. Such discipline is unlikely 
to occur automatically, without strong political support. Yet, in Rwanda such political support 
can be assured given the strong party structure present up to the lowest administrative level in 
the country. However, for the moment there is insufficient evidence to prove that there is strong 
political will to encourage local entities to collect the right data. Another problematic aspect 
is that local entities are considered as mere outposts for data collection (MINECOFIN, 2005). 
The new M&E framework as presented in the Cabinet Paper views local entities mainly as in-
formation collectors to feed into the national level. In case decentralisation is taken seriously 
there is also need for a reverse information stream and for analysis and feedback into local de-
cision-making (Holvoet and Renard, 2007; Lucas et al., 2004). Decentralisation and M&E by 
local authorities are processes that should twin each other in terms of mandate and capacities; 
otherwise they risk being mutually undermining. 
Second, independence and impartiality are crucial elements of M&E guidelines and 
standards[9]. Independence can be furthered by the location of the units responsible for M&E: a 
unit close to the operational level may strengthen the level of feedback but it jeopardises M&E 
independence. Line ministries are for example charged with the identification of key perform-
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ess. The Strategic Planning Unit (SPU) of MINECOFIN acts as a coordinator, yet it is not strongly 
anchored into the M&E framework or given an outspoken mandate that could improve the im-
partiality. The institutional framework does not take independent evaluation actors on board. 
Civil society is not given a formal role, neither is parliament. Similarly, no mention is made of 
independent research institutes or the Rwandan Evaluation Network. Donor representatives 
can have an independent say when participating to the joint sector reviews, but they are neither 
really part of the national M&E framework. The lack of independence is of special concern given 
the strong top-down control of the ruling party.
A final concern of the Rwandan M&E framework is that M&E mandates and rela-
tionships are very unclear (which hampers at the same time horizontal and vertical integration). 
Defining a well-functioning M&E system is not a one night’s business. Defining and dividing 
responsibilities in a clear manner as well as establishing good relationships and information 
flows are key to it. Some examples may clarify. While the SPU considers itself the main M&E unit 
within MINECOFIN, not all its members agree upon its tasks. The division of labour among the 
SPU and the National Institute of Statistics (NIS) is e.g. not clear-cut.  Data collection, which 
is currently given great importance, obviously falls under the responsibility of the NIS. But by 
mid-2006, it was for both the SPU and the NIS not entirely clear who should bring together and 
analyse information from country-wide M&E exercises such as the Household Living Conditions 
Survey (EICV), Demographic and Health Surveys, Sector Reviews and Annual Progress Reports 
(APR). Similar ambiguities raise when it comes to ensuring M&E capacities, ensuring flows of 
information (both horizontally and vertically), the relationship between monitoring information 
(provided by CEPEX[10]) and evaluation, the roles of MINECOFIN[11] and line ministries.
Governments committed to progress on poverty reduction have a sincere interest 
in a well-functioning and institutionalised M&E system. Neverending transitions wrapped into 
foggy mandate clouds can be very comfortable for less committed ones. 
3.2.	 Champions	but	no	cheerleaders[12]
The national M&E framework in Rwanda suffers not only from continuously being 
under construction, but also from a lack of clear demand and incentives, despite the presence of 
some M&E champions. Championship, cheerleadership, demand and supply of M&E are inter-
related, since champions have to trigger demand and supply in order to become cheerleaders 
spreading M&E nationally. As demand and supply are also very much related to interests of 
stakeholders for M&E (or sometimes more importantly, for non-M&E) this leads straight to poli-
tics of M&E. Several sources of demand and supply and potential candidates for champion- and 
cheerleadership can be identified in Rwanda. Despite the multiplicity of potential sources for 
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3.2.1.	 Government	of	Rwanda
Sincere commitment to the PRSP framework implies adherence to the results-based 
and iterative learning process. One may thus expect the Government of Rwanda (GOR) to be a 
first potential source for M&E demand. In practice, the GoR shows a keen interest in improving 
data collection, which is evident from the emphasis given to the NIS (see also OECD/DAC, 2007). 
It has resulted so far in an upsurge in data collection; both quantitative as well as qualitative. 
This stands in sharp contrast to a serious deficit in analysis (Amis et al., 2005: 10; Kanyarukiga 
et al., 2006; Mutebi et al., 2001: 35; Purcell et al., 2006). A noteworthy exception is the NIS 
2007 Preliminary Poverty Update Report which is based on a comparison of results of the latest 
2005/06 EICV (Enquête Intégrale sur les Conditions de Vie des Ménages) with those of EICV1 
(2000/01). It provides for the first time a frank overview of changes in poverty and inequality, 
documenting that the unequal distribution of growth in combination with high initial levels of 
inequality have impaired the potential poverty reducing effect of the growth registered[13] (NIS, 
2006). At various places, different layers of disaggregation are included (gender, urban/rural, 
provinces). While this first post-genocide ‘evaluative’ initiative is laudable, identifying not only 
‘levels of outcomes’ but also ‘changes in outcomes’, there are clearly major shortcomings when it 
comes to the analytical, evaluative quality of the exercise[14]. The analysis does not include con-
founding factors to arrive at some measure of ‘impact’, it hardly probes into underlying reasons 
for (non)-or varied performance and neither does it distinguish between implementation failures 
and conceptual flaws in policies. Deficient analytical quality obviously puts into perspective the 
very fundamentals of evidence-based and iterative policy-making.
The GoR has proven to be forceful at various occasions, therefore we believe it has 
the technical capacity to create more incentives and encourage various actors to provide infor-
mation and analysis about what is happening in the hills of Rwanda in terms of poverty reduction. 
But is there political will to do so? Some highly qualified Rwandans were hired by MINECOFIN, 
in the M&E department. With the financial support of donors (DFID), the SPU – M&E depart-
ment – was well equipped and staff attractively remunerated (at least until mid-2006)[15]. The 
capacities observed at various levels in Rwanda are at times impressive, particularly within cen-
tral ministries. This leads to the questioning whether the often invoked capacity constraints 
also partly conceal a lack of political will[16].
Thanks to the capacities present, the department harboured some true M&E cham-
pions. Yet, the enthusiasm remained largely within department circles and did not trickle down 
to the system as a whole or its components, the sector ministries or decentralised entities (see 
also Purcell et al., 2006). Indicative is the exercise of self-evaluation by the sector ministries, 
launched by SPU. All the sector departments had to assess their own M&E system on the basis 
of which improvements would have been suggested and implemented. This was supposed to 
contribute to the creation and stimulation of internal demand for M&E. On the basis of these 
evaluations key performance indicators (KPI) were to be identified by each sector. The exercise 
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3.2.2.	 Parliament	of	Rwanda
In line with the principles of parliamentary democracy, parliament is supposed 
to act as interpellator to the national government. On paper at least, this should constitute a 
powerful demand for M&E. Yet, the Rwandan parliament is still in “a process of learning and 
consolidating its newly found autonomy”(Evans et al., 2006: 65). It currently only deals with 
summaries of M&E reports and little independent demand or supply can be expected from it in 
the short term[17]. 
3.2.3.	 Auditor	General
Since the 2003 Constitution (art.183-184), the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) 
is the supreme audit institution of Rwanda. In some countries the Auditor General plays an im-
portant role in evaluation. Apart from controlling and checking accounting and spending (finan-
cial audit), shedding a light upon efficiency and effectiveness (performance audit) forms part 
of the AG’s mission. Although the office of the Office of the AG airs some criticism, it targets 
mainly the technical input level of the public sector (whether tender procedures were followed 
or not, procedures of recruitment etcetera). More critical issues such as the intermingling of the 
public and private sector in Rwanda are not scrutinised[18]. Although performance auditing lies 
clearly within the mandate of the AG, there is currently no personnel to take up the auditing task 
from that perspective[19], neither are the incentives to undertake thorough performance audit-
ing present. 
3.2.4.	 Civil	society
Various sources for M&E demands and supply can lie outside the regime structures. 
Many of these outside actors can not only increase demand but may also offer interesting infor-
mation and analysis on the achievements or shortcomings of national policies (supply side). The 
– in principle – independent character of non-state actors makes them particularly worthwhile. 
Research	institutes
Potentially important sources for M&E supply (and demand) are national research 
institutes and universities. Of course, capacities of universities and institutes have to be put in 
Rwandan perspective; the genocide targeted explicitly intellectuals and the National University 
of Rwanda (NUR) suffered severely in 1994. It takes time to rebuild institutes, to train people 
and even after 12 years one cannot expect the wounds to be entirely healed. At the same time 
one cannot but observe that Rwanda counts some well-trained people, also in its universities. 
In Kigali, universities and higher education centres have grown fast. Comparing this situation 
to other low-income countries, we find Rwanda not scoring particularly low in terms of avail-
able capacity. At two specific occasions, the University of Butare, in collaboration with OSSREA 
(Organisation for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa)[20], conducted M&E 
[17]	 	Various	parliamentary	reports	displayed	a	lack	of	independence	and	an	acting	for	the	RPF	party	cause.	One	of	the	
most	notable	reports	is	the	so-called	2004	Report	on	Divisionism	(Commission	Parlementaire,	2004).	
[18]	 	Similarly,	in	the	Joint	Evaluation	of	General	Budget	Support,	Purcell	et	al.	(2006:	S9)	indicate	that “while corrup-
tion is generally perceived as not being a problem in Rwanda, risks of subtle forms of corruption, such as exclusion patterns and 
concentration of economic power, might be increasing”.	
[19]	 	In	their	Baseline	Survey	of	Donor	Harmonisation	and	Alignment	in	Rwanda,	Amis	et	al.	(2005:	7)	noted	that “the 
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exercises oriented towards poverty reduction. In 2002 (between the interim and final PRSP) it 
published the results of the Poverty Reduction Policies Relevance Test and in February 2006 a 
report based on citizen report cards (CRC) – a grassroots participatory method of data collec-
tion. Poverty Reduction Policies Relevance Tests can be particularly useful as (ex-ante) appraisal 
tools assessing the degree to which envisaged policies are likely to contribute to poverty reduc-
tion; CRCs provide insights into citizens’ appreciation of services provided. While both M&E ex-
ercises are highly laudable initiatives that are characterised by unprecedented levels of citizen 
participation (see also Evans et al., 2006), two critical notes deserve to be made. First, in terms 
of quality the two reports miss out on crucial linkages and layers of analysis. Data collected are 
not explicitly linked to specific policies and breakdowns to relevant social categories are absent. 
Potentially diverging responses and differential policy effects among income groups, regions, 
urban-rural and gender remain under-explored.  Evidently this severely hampers the usefulness 
of research efforts for policy-making and evaluation. 
A second remark regards constraints research institutes and universities face in 
terms of independency. It remains therefore unclear whether the aforementioned analytical 
shortcomings are due to a deficit in capacity or in independency. A mandatory system of obtain-
ing authorisations is e.g. discouraging researchers to engage in sensitive topics such as land. 
Even more, this system also leads to a-priori selections - self-censorship[21] - of research topics 
by researchers. Taken the history of the country into account, it is judged wiser not to touch 
upon certain issues in order to avoid tensions at local and central level. Self-censorship is quite 
an effective way to deal with potentially critical voices. Another technique to silence critical 
voices is co-opting individuals of institutes into party structures. The appointing practice by the 
GoR of for example the rector of the NUR is an illustration of the active use of this technique in 
Rwanda. Overwhelming critical researchers or professors with administrative or teaching ac-
tivities or nominate them country representatives at international fora are more covert ways of 
cooptation or silencing applied. The combined effect of this all, results in little sound and critical 
M&E supply from Rwandan universities, institutes or research centres. 
Non-governmental	organisations
National and international NGOs are another important set of actors in civil society. 
While some representatives indicated that policy-making has become more participatory and 
inclusive since 2000 (see Evans et al., 2006; Purcell et al, 2006), NGOs have not been awarded 
a consistent and formal role in the monitoring and evaluation of the PRSP[22]. In short, as Purcell 
et al. (2006: 52) point out: “overall, the policy process remains rather “top-down”, with ma-
jor policy shifts prepared by a small high-powered executive task forces, limited consultation 
(including of International Partners) especially on potentially sensitive issues, and Cabinet ap-
proval marking an almost immediate start of implementation”. Furthermore, and particularly 
relevant in the context of this research, is the fact that “the top-down nature of the policy proc-
ess puts limits on the experience feeding into learning and adaption; this is a government which 
is convinced that it knows what is best for its people” (Purcell et al., 2006: 55).
Participation or even consultation in Rwanda is indeed often understood as ‘persua-
sion’ and ‘consciousness-raising’ about what is best for the people (see also Pottier, 2006); in 
[21]	 	Mutebi	et	al.	(2001:	15)	refer	to	an	editor-in-chief	who	indicated	that	newspapers	practice	self-censorship	as “‘a 
survival mechanism’, given the fact that the public and the government are far from being tolerant towards ‘excessive criticism’ of 
the government during what is regarded a period of national healing”.	
[22]	 	See	Renard	and	Molenaers	(2003)	on	the	participation	of	civil	society	in	the	first	PRSP.	
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the words of a local administrative officer “once the people have understood they will agree”[23]; 
end of the participation process. If civil society is to contribute to M&E, independence is impor-
tant. Yet, several governmental actions and incidents have led to a restrained political climate 
and a serious curtailment of freedom of association and action for national and international 
NGOs (see also Jordaan, 2006). 2003 was particularly pernicious to the freedom of opinion 
and speech. In that year the opposition party Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR) 
was banned and several civil society organisations – among which the leading human rights 
organisation Liprodhor – were bashed in a parliamentary report. The run-up period to the con-
stitutional referendum and the local elections further narrowed down the room for criticism and 
freedom of speech. In 2004 a parliamentary report blamed several NGOs among which again 
Liprodhor, but also the Flemish umbrella NGO 11.11.11., for ‘divisionism’. The notion of ‘divi-
sionism’ is (ab)used by the GoR at many occasions to silence all sorts and types of opposition 
and criticism. The GoR anxiously stresses the unity of all Rwandans, without distinctions such 
as ethnicity. Given the awful genocide history, divisionism is a strong and legitimate concern 
in the fight to genocide ideologies. Yet, its distorted use turns it into a muzzle. Add to this the 
very restrictive law on civil society organisations that stipulates that “associations have to ap-
ply yearly for a renewed recognition; that the Minister of Justice may suspend the activities of 
an organisation when she / he discretionally judges them a threat to the law, public order or 
good moral standards of the country” (Law N°20/2000) then the self-censoring attitude of civil 
society organisations starts to make sense, even for international NGOs. Reacting critically can 
jeopardise next year’s registration and puts thus in danger the presence and survival of an en-
tire organisation and its jobs in the country[24]. In addition to this ‘straight-jacket-like’ political 
opportunity structure, particular practices such as cooptation of associations are applied. The 
least one can say is that the Rwandan opportunity structure is not at all enabling critical voices 
of NGOs. According to interviewees from civil society organisations the Ministry of Local Affairs 
– responsible for the registration of NGOs – conveys a clear message to them that civil society 
organisations in Rwanda should be service deliverers, not critical watchdogs; they should be 
partners of government instead of opposing it (see also Evans et al., 2006: 64; Wyss, 2006). 
In short, there is little room for advocacy NGOs and the few that are still active are 
heavily criticised as if they want to divide the country[25]. There is also a tendency of the GoR to 
talk only with umbrella organisations, mainly for reasons of representation and manageability. 
Given the increasing number of ‘brief-case’ NGOs, the issue of ‘representativeness’ of NGOs 
and CSOs is certainly valid (see also Evans et al., 2006: 61). However, it also holds for umbrella 
organisations that tend to be located in Kigali, and who increasingly become alienated from the 
poor in rural areas, given the striking wealth differences among the capital and the countryside 
and the decreased accessibility of the capital for the rural poor[26]. This climate – on top of cul-
tural aspects of (self-)restraint - explains why there is little critical analysis and demand coming 
from national ánd international NGOs, even though the formal room for criticism may not be 
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the well-known image of chicken transported to the African markets, legs tied together. Upon 
arrival its owner can easily untie the legs; the animal will remain in the same, cramped posi-
tion, unconscious of its regained freedom. Remarkably and indicative of the formal room of ma-
noeuvre that does exist, national and international NGOs have joined forces in commenting on 
the 2004 APR[27]. The comments were extremely relevant: no impact analysis of progress on 
poverty is provided, lack of smart indicators, the problem of the choice of the international lan-
guage in Rwanda (English-French[28]), lack of considering impacts on the poor of prima facie 
pro-environment measures[29] and finally the governance discussion in the APR-report is not 
considered useful. The central message of questioning the pro-poor character of the PRSP policy 
does not seem to have made it to the central level. The civil society report was not taken up or 
embraced by the international community, which could have taken these legitimate concerns 
forward. Unfortunately enough this event seems to be only one symptom of the non-support-
ive donor behaviour for potentially critical voices. Delays in NGO report releases are e.g. rarely 
protested against. Critical reports are most often released with substantial delays or personnel 
being intimidated[30]. By the time reports get out, interests have often waned and criticisms are 
presented as outdated. This is of course completely undermining M&E efforts even for interna-
tional NGOs. In conclusion, the Rwandan opportunity structure does not really encourage civil 
society to take up the cheerleader mandate. 
3.2.5.	 Donor	community	
Hope for strong M&E cheerleadership therefore must be vested in the international 
donor community. Donors indeed create demand for M&E. In first instance, demand is created 
on the basis of donor needs and donor accountability to its own constituencies. Only in second 
and limited instance, donors create demand for iterative learning processes of the partner coun-
try. At this stage, the particular constellation of donors present in Rwanda and their division de-
serves to be briefly clarified (see below for a more detailed discussion). Aid is marked by politics 
in Rwanda due to the national and regional context and the political and governance conditions 
in the country on which bi-lateral donors continue to have divergent opinions (see e.g. Purcell et 
al., 2006; Uvin, 2001). This has led to a major split between donors with on the one hand the 
like-minded donors giving general budget support (EC, UK, Sweden, WB and the African Devel-
opment Bank) and on the other hand the non-budget support group. In general, members of the 
latter are more critical about the political evolutions in the country[31] and the region[32]; they 
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assistance at sector level. Depending upon the type of support, donors create different types 
of M&E demand. This implies that they can play different roles in cheerleading M&E. Impor-
tant non-budget donors are Belgium[33], Germany, the Netherlands, USAID, Japan and Canada. 
Among them there are some minor variations in the use of the national M&E system. Some do-
nors use CEPEX to a limited extent to monitor their projects – at times it is only seen as a report-
ing obligation, whereas others (e.g. USAID) do not use that national mechanism at all (see Amis 
et al., 2005; OECD/DAC, 2007). These donors all (even if to varying degrees) continue perform-
ing their own project or programme evaluations. They use that information, both for their own 
learning (it provides input for new projects and initiatives), and for their accountability to the 
home parliaments. This manner of conducting M&E is not in line with the Paris Declaration on 
Harmonisation and Alignment. M&E in the education sector is an exception to such one-sided 
donor M&E that has no clear connection to national systems. As will be demonstrated below, 
the education sector is most advanced in terms of M&E in Rwanda and several Joint Sector Re-
views (JSR) have taken place. Under the strong leadership of DFID (budget support donor), non-
budget support donors start to use these JSR in the education sector for their own M&E purpos-
es, but that process has only just begun. In general, non-budget support donors are reluctant to 
use national M&E due to its poor quality, reliability and independence. By the same token, they 
don’t provide many incentives and demands for a strong national M&E system. While changes 
are discernable, they are predominantly driven by learning and accountability questions that are 
directly related to their own interventions and they still do not feed back potentially interesting 
information into national M&E systems. Their desire to satisfy their own M&E demands makes 
them oblivious to the need to also build a nationally integrated M&E system. 
Budget support donors embrace the logic of strengthening the national system and 
this makes them potential cheerleaders for a strong national M&E system. The paradox though 
is that, while Dfid, one of the most important BS donors, has invested a lot in building an educa-
tion sector M&E system it has not given similar support to the elaboration of the overall central 
M&E system (see also Kanyarukiga et al., 2006: 41). Some donors indeed gave some techni-
cal assistance to MINECOFIN (Belgium, WB, Dfid) without however taking the national M&E 
cause really forward. Unlike in many other countries, there is for example no working group on 
M&E[34]. The Development Partnership Framework[35] is so far not focusing on a harmonised 
approach to M&E, even though this could be a huge step forward in harmonisation and align-
ment and cut back the M&E burden. 
Indeed, as the political opportunity structure indicates, donors have their own in-
terests in the partner country. These should not be hidden, but managed jointly with national 
needs for learning and accountability in order to reinforce M&E demand and supply. The ac-
countability and learning needs of donors and the partner country need not be conceived of as 
[33]  The situation is gradually changing in the case of Belgium as it is increasingly moving towards sectoral budget 
support. Over the period 2006-2007 it has disbursed about 3.5 million € in the Joint Education Sector Support Pro-
gram (JESS) and from 2008 onwards it plans to support both the educational and health sector through SBS (for an 
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conflicting, actually they are not. Obviously, if a government does not allow uncensored evidence 
to be produced– with both generation of positive and negative findings – from the ground and 
from several actors involved, iterative evidence-based learning and policy-making cannot be 
expected to function. One cannot but conclude that the lack of cheerleaders and clear demands 
is a very comfortable situation for the GoR as it limits the risk of unveiling flaws in its national 
poverty policy or its implementation. Yet, the undermining of M&E has an enormous impact 
upon the quality of government interventions in terms of relevance, effectiveness and impact 
and on the sustainability of the new aid paradigm in the long run. 
3.3.	 Decentralisation:	reform	once	again
Decentralisation is considered an instrument to increase effectiveness, accessibil-
ity, and accountability. In 2001 an important decentralisation and redrawing of the adminis-
trative map of Rwanda took place. The old communes were transformed into larger districts, 
comprising more and at times other sectors than before. A parallel process at cell level took 
place. In January 2006 a new reform was implemented. Again the number of districts and sec-
tors was cut back by merging and regrouping old sectors and districts. Further the old eleven 
provinces were abolished and four new regions formed: the region of the South, the North, the 
East and the West. The capital of Kigali remains a separate entity. The latest reform caught 
many donors by surprise (see also Purcell et al., 2006) and some reacted hesitantly. But donor 
apprehensions cooled off rapidly; indeed decentralisation is a process that is generally encour-
aged by donors[36]; why would it not be this time? The government of Rwanda presents the 2006 
reform not as a true reform, but only as a step in a continuous process of decentralisation that 
started in 2001. It argues that this new step will further contribute to bringing services closer to 
the people (while it actually does the contrary) and, most importantly the administrative staff 
reform accompanying the process will increase substantially the capacities of the decentralised 
levels. This reform led to a severe reduction of staff at the ministries (central level) in order to 
engage them at decentralised level. The amount of money transferred to the districts increased 
substantially, making the decentralisation more real than before. In addition to the cash, each 
district was asked to develop a ‘performance contract’ (“contrats de performance”), a sort of ac-
tion plan for 2006. These contracts were designed rather quickly and immediately after the lo-
cal elections of early 2006. President Kagame held a ceremony to make these performance con-
tracts more official and well-known. The GoR argues that nothing but good will spring from this 
new decentralisation. We argue that, although the increased means of districts are a positive 
step forward in terms of decentralisation, the process potentially has the side-effect of weaken-
ing monitoring and evaluation in Rwanda. 
First of all, the 2006 decentralisation may be intended to increase capacities at lo-
cal level, but in fact it destroyed previous capacity building initiatives at local level. Donors and 
international NGOs took the 2001 decentralisation at heart and set up several capacity building 
initiatives[37]. These previous investments were disrupted and can mostly be considered lost 
when personnel and structures changed in 2006 (at a time that some of the programmes were 
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are often sent to districts they do not know[38]. Others refuse to move to remote districts and 
prefer to look for alternative employment. Further, the large majority of district staff has to hold 
a university degree. While well-educated staff is laudable, experience deserves not to be com-
pletely overruled. In this way all institutional memory at sector and district level is swept out. 
This has its negative effects upon data collection and analysis (Elkins, 2006: 9). For the moment, 
M&E at decentralised level is back to its starting point. In line with the new M&E framework 
presented above local entities are expected to become important links in the M&E chain. The 
lack of proper vertical integration and clear divisions of responsibilities gives rise to a free M&E 
discourse as if local entities can organise M&E activities upon whichever issue they wish. The 
lack of capacity for data collection and particularly analysis in combination with a strong top-
down party system leads to a far from free M&E practice at local level. Clearer divisions of tasks 
and responsibilities are needed to strengthen local M&E. Further, better-defined mandates and 
operational structures are required to improve vertical integration. Inexperienced personnel, at 
times unfamiliar with the region, are not enabling such vertical integration. The performance 
contracts (“contrats de performance”) can hardly be said to be evidence-based policy-making, 
even more, they incorporate non-realistic goals such as moving from 1% of improved toilets to 
100%. The new administrative structure complicated using existing data, as did the time con-
straints. The question now is how these contracts will be used in the future. The ‘ceremonial’ at-
tention given to these contracts by the President has led to a widespread awareness of their ex-
istence. They are said to contribute to the accountability of the local entities. While this may be 
true in theory, it is doubtful whether such an increased accountability for non-realistic perform-
ance contracts is a positive sign to the local entities, in casu the districts. When these contracts 
become instruments to judge district performance they risk leading to biased M&E at district 
level and undoubtedly results will be wrapped up more nicely than they nakedly are. When con-
tract performance is evaluated at central level, its unrealistic character provides central authori-
ties the perfect excuse to dismiss whomever they want. In a strong, hierarchical top-down party 
system as exists in Rwanda, arbitrariness is not to be excluded: the performance contracts risk 
serving as sham arguments of objectivity and accountability[39]. 
Another problem with decentralisation in Rwanda and the increased powers of 
the districts is the inherent tension that exists between the national poverty reduction strat-
egy (PRSP) and decentralisation[40]. PRSP sets national targets owned by the central GoR and 
decentralised entities should work towards those targets. A genuine decentralisation implies 
entities that set targets themselves; these may not necessarily coincide with those of the na-
tional government. The summation of all district priorities does not automatically bring about 
the national targets. Two ways are possible to solve this tension. Either national target setting 




[39]	 	Similarly,	Gordillo	and	Andersson	(2004:	310)	argue	that	“in political regimes where incentives to share M&E infor-
mation with actors outside the immediate sphere are low, M&E information is often used as a mechanism to exert top-down 
control, monitor and restrain their agents”.	
[40]	 	Driscoll	and	Evans	(2005:	11,	based	on	Holmes	with	Evans,	2003)	note	that	decentralisation	initiatives	delegat-
ing	new	functions	to	weak	institutions	are	rarely	well	integrated	with	the	national	PRS	or	budget	process.		The	Rwan-
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between the central level and the districts. The type of regime can be determinant for the route 
taken. As discussed above, the participation record in Rwanda is poor. The strong party hierar-
chy, which can be felt down to the lowest level, facilitates coordination between the national and 
the local; it happens automatically. This ‘natural symbiosis’ however also sheds a critical light 
on the character of decentralisation in Rwanda. A more genuine decentralisation would, again, 
require a much more formalised system with clear-cut rules and division of responsibilities and 
systems of mediation in case of conflicting approaches at the various levels. This is completely 
lacking in Rwanda. The ‘natural symbiosis’ between the central and decentralised level is prob-
lematic in M&E terms as it fundamentally jeopardises independent M&E. When independence 
is missing, M&E risks becoming a shallow and formalistic exercise, incapable of contributing to 
sincere evidence-based learning – one of the PRSP cornerstones. 
3.4.	 Best	practices	in	education
The M&E practices in education are rightly referred to as ‘best practices’ in Rwanda 
(see e.g.  Evans et al., 2006; Hayman, 2007; MINECOFIN, 2006; OECD/DAC, 2007; Purcell et al., 
2006). Although the process may not yet be optimal, the progress made the final years is prom-
ising. In 2003 a sector plan for education was developed, followed by a corresponding budget 
plan and a Joint Sector Review at the end of that year. In the 2005 JSR not only expenditures 
were reported against, but also linkages between the plan, budget and MTEF were established. 
In 2006 a fourth JSR in education took place (MINEDUC, 2006a). Although linking expendi-
tures to results and outcomes remains problematic, a great evolution has taken place within 
the sector from 2003 to 2006. Dfid is the lead donor in education and plays an important role 
in the organisation of the joint sector reviews. The Dfid support to education corresponds to its 
approach of engaging into programmes that underpin the effectiveness of BS. The GoR remains 
in the driver’s seat of the JSRs, determining the indicators and topics discussed, which is obvi-
ously good in terms of ownership. The focus of Dfid assistance lies in getting procedures right 
and strengthening them. In that regard progress has been made on Key Performance Indicators 
(KPI). The indicator matrices for education have been revised and improved to move beyond 
activities to sub-sector achievements. Yet, even after revision, indicators are not fully adhered 
to and the KPIs are not routinely monitored. The GoR has taken lines of the matrix out and has 
added others in. The inconsequent use of KPI has curtailed the JSR somewhat to an instrument 
measuring what is going on, instead of what progress is being made. The ad hoc reporting on 
indicators still needs to evolve into a continuous and coherent process. 
Another field where improvement is still underway is the horizontal integration. 
MINECOFIN is not truly supporting the education sector in conducting JSRs, the feeding in of 
the JSRs into the Annual Progress Report (APR) is similarly weak as is the cross-fertilization of 
good practice in education towards other line ministries. 
One of the threats to the current process of JSR in education springs from the divide 
between GBS donors and non-budget support donors. A crucial element in a JSR is the data used 
in the review. The wider and more diverse the range of sources and data, the more comprehen-
sive and reliable the review becomes (see also GTZ/BMZ, 2004). Given the larger engagement 
of BS donors in the process, a lot of project information falls outside the scope of the review. 
Although the JSR is not restricted to donors providing BS, the open door policy does not seduce 
“Marrying a bottom up planning process with top down national sector policies”.
The Denial of Politics in PRSP’s Monitoring and Evaluation 
Experiences From RwandaIOB Discussion PaPer 2008-02 • 31
many project donors to come fully on board and they are not actively encouraged to do so[42]. 
NGO projects face the same threshold. Project information can shed an additional light upon 
many matters because of the field experience and knowledge they harbour. Moreover projects 
and programmes may often be considered ‘pilots’, focusing on specific innovative activities or 
vulnerable groups. Characteristic of BS donors is that they often do not engage any longer at lo-
cal level, which bars them from local knowledge and implementation realities on the ground[43]. 
Furthermore, the Management Information System (MIS) is weak and gives at best a picture of 
actual users. It does not provide information on the ones that currently remain out. An optimal 
JSR would thus take all initiatives in the sector on board in order to maximise the exercise (see 
also Kanyarukiga et al., 2006). Some projects have indeed been taken on board during certain 
reviews, such as the Belgian School Management project (VVOB). The project has been judged 
an interesting pilot and school management has now been integrated in the sector plan. Yet, 
this type of integration seems rather exceptional and depending upon personal linkages and 
lead donor appreciation of particular projects. Without the systematic integration of project 
information into sector evaluations and weak government MIS, sector reviews risk becoming 
somewhat disconnected from the realities in the field (see also the example below). For both 
budget supporters and non-budget supporters there are incentives towards a better integration. 
Budget supporters would get reality-checks from the field and information from non-budget 
supporters would at least be used beyond project level. Participation into the JSR process would 
provide them increased insight into the sector wherein they are funding particular projects, pro-
grammes or target populations. If they gain trust in the process, it could eventually convince 
them to abandon part of the repetitious and burdensome project M&E exercises and to perform 
a better ex-ante identification of those M&E activities that are worthwhile beyond the specific 
project level. 
Government ownership over the JSR in education is rightly applauded (see a.o. 
Purcell et al., 2006); there is a need for a strong lead. Such strong ownership needs of course 
to coincide with a system of checks and balances without which strong owner- and leadership 
may derail. As discussed above donors have the highest potential in Rwanda’s POS to provide 
some sort of checks and balances. Donors are on board within the cluster (sector working group) 
framework and the JSR; even more, Dfid as the lead donor plays an important role in the proc-
ess. We observed a sincere concern with the ‘process’, yet it mainly regards rather formal and 
technical process aspects, while there is a relative neglect of matters of ‘substance’. Substantial 
concerns in Rwanda regard, more often than not, politically related issues; that is most probably 
why many donors shy away from them. But ignoring politically sensitive issues in evaluations 
or reviews fundamentally affects the process to the point that it not only becomes oblivious 
of political flows but also technically incorrect. The following example illustrates the point we 
make. Secondary enrolment has been on the rise during the PRSP period (MINEDUC, 2006b), 
but there is still a large dropout during and after primary education[44] (World Development 
Indicators Database, 2006). Yet, little information on the pupils in secondary school is made 
[42]	 	Referring	to	interviews	with	donor	agencies,	Hayman	(2007:	376)	highlights	that “smaller donors to the sector, such 
as France, Belgium and Germany often feel excluded from discussions”.	
[43]	 	In	their	evaluation	of	the	2000-2005	Dfid	Country	programme	of	Rwanda,	Kanyarukiga	et	al.	(2006:	41)	explic-
itly	indicate “that Dfid Rwanda is very strongly oriented at central agencies; it is distant from other important players in line 
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available. Disaggregated information on for example social categories (gender, region, …) and 
income quintiles of the students may provide relevant information that can feed into the (sec-
ondary) education policy of the GoR. While the JSR does not provide this type of information, dis-
aggregated data – for example for income groups, have been collected during household surveys 
(EICV). The existing surveys are however largely under-analysed and cross-readings between 
sectors and these surveys remains marginal so far[45],[46] (see also Kanyarukiga et al., 2006: 
21). 
When crucial information is lacking, it affects the quality and methodological cor-
rectness of the review. While certain data are gathered in other surveys - such as the EICV – oth-
er, even more politically sensitive information, is not collected at all. Since 1998 a fund for the 
survivors of the genocide has been called into existence, the FARG[47] (Fonds d’Assistance aux 
Rescapés du Génocide). The FARG assists, amongst others, survivors who want to enter second-
ary school by paying school fees for these children. In the hills of Rwanda, the fund causes dis-
content, as many non-survivors (Hutu) cannot afford to go to school, whereas survivors (Tutsi) 
can go to secondary school – thanks to the FARG. The animosity caused by the FARG is well-
known to all those living in the country for a while (Rombouts, 2004). Linking the high dropout 
rate with the FARG seems therefore evident, at the very least interesting. Given Rwanda’s his-
tory it would be particularly unwise for donors to support an education system that leads to 
an obvious ethnic bias. The concern over the existing horizontal inequalities (HI)[48] and how 
the government is handling them is at least legitimate[49]. Brown and Stewart (2007) identify 
at least three instrumental reasons: HI impact negatively on poverty reduction targets, eco-
nomic efficiency and they can be a source of violent conflict. Yet donors - mainly BS donors - are 
not convinced. In interviews with the lead donor, this particular issue was dismissed as a minor 
problem, which will disappear automatically in some years as it is believed that the FARG will 
be dissolved. Such “minor side issues” do not affect the larger procedural picture they want to 
focus on. Yet, when this type of information is not integrated and handled upon through cor-
rective policy measures it obviously jeopardises projected outputs (‘increased and particularly 
indiscriminate access’) and undermines the achievement of goals  (‘universal primary (second-
ary) education’) set by the government itself. Moreover, exclusive education policies will in the 
long run not lead to inclusive poverty reduction. Uneven access to secondary education affects 
uneven access to higher education. As the 2006 decentralisation policy determines that almost 
all staff at decentralised level has to have a university degree this will indirectly impact upon the 










[48]	 	Stewart	(2006:	2)	defines	horizontal	inequalities	(HI)	as	“(social, economic and political) inequalities among groups 
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subject in Rwandan society because of its direct link to the genocide, and its ethnic overtone 
– a social reality the GoR officially wants to get rid off and along whose lines no data is disag-
gregated[51]. It is absolutely politically incorrect to talk about Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda, even 
though they remain relevant concepts in Rwandan society. We argue though that shying away 
from political sensitive issues may lead to false pictures, with nice results at aggregate levels 
covering up distortions at disaggregated levels (see Ravallion, 2006, 2007; Stewart, 2006). We 
do however not suggest that donors have to walk around like elephants in a porcelain house. In 
a country like Rwanda, bluntly ignoring the political context – for example by requesting to list 
up ethnicities – is not only completely unacceptable; it constitutes a true killing assumption to 
donor action. In section four, we argue that acceptable ways to tackle ‘political’ sensitive issues 
do exist. Yet, so far donors were not brave enough to use the room of manoeuvre they do have 
and are politically indulgent (Browne, 2007; Uvin, 2001).
3.5.	 Donors’	boomerang	play
The international donor group in Rwanda is a divided community with budget sup-
porters and others; friendly donors and others; donors strong in policy dialogue and others; fran-
cophone and Anglophone-oriented donors (see also Browne, 2007; Purcell et al., 2006; Uvin, 
2001). The donor divide impacts both upon the collaboration among donors and between do-
nors and the GoR. 
3.5.1.	 Leap	of	faith
For the Rwandan GBS one cannot but conclude that the starting point was a-typi-
cal. Providing GBS to Rwanda was a political decision (see also Purcell et al., 2006) and not, as 
often in other countries, resulting from a gradual process moving from sector support or estab-
lished sector programmes towards the central level. In Rwanda, strong sector programmes with 
amongst others established M&E systems were not yet present. Budget support was a leap of 
faith[52]; faith in the willingness and competence of the GoR. This leads e.g. to the situation in 
which the EC conditions for sector budget support – including an ex-ante assessment on seven 
areas amongst which M&E[53]– are not yet fulfilled (even not for the education sector) while the 
EC provides GBS (see also Purcell et al., 2006). This indicates that donors – including GBS do-
nors – are somehow aware of the embryonic stages the sector M&E systems are in. 
From the perspective of the GoR, the fact that substantial amounts of general 
budget support can be generated, even if conditions for sectoral BS are not satisfied, makes 
investment in evaluative exercises and ‘knowledge’ even more counterproductive. As Pritchett 
(2002:268) puts it: “if a program can already generate sufficient support to be adequately fund-
ed then knowledge is a danger”.
While we do not argue for a rooting of GBS in SBS, we do believe that the political 
character of the engagement and the a-typical kick off position implies somehow that GBS in 
Rwanda cannot be applied in the same way as in countries where the sectoral building blocks 
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operation[54]; hardly sustainable in the long run. In general, differing conditions at entry need 
to lead to a different type of GBS and donor involvement, such as better follow up and capacity 
building at sector level, at the same time stimulating the involvement of central ministries (M&E 
coordination unit) in this process (in order not to distort the incentives towards alignment to the 
central level)[55]. Yet, we found this twin-track approach of involvement at sectoral and central 
ministry level not to be the case in Rwanda, except for the Dfid involvement in the education 
sector[56]. 
3.5.2.	 Cracked	donor	front
An Aid Coordination, Harmonisation and Alignment (ACHA) framework has been 
developed. MINECOFIN is central to it and the Development Partners Coordination Group 
(DPCG) functions within this framework. It is the highest-level coordination structure in Rwanda, 
drawing its membership from government representatives and heads of cooperation in bi- and 
multilateral agencies (MINECOFIN, 2006). This forum facilitates coordination and harmonisa-
tion. Yet, development partners do not share the same vision; there is no donor front (Browne, 
2007). 
The BS-donor group is strong in Rwanda and non-BS donors consider the flow of 
information between them and the BS-group very difficult. The BS-donors work a lot together 
as well as with the Rwandan government – there is a specific Budget Support Harmonisation 
Group (MINECOFIN, 2006). Non-budget support donors are not involved in WB or IMF mis-
sions; they do not formally participate in the Joint Review of Budget Support. No institutional 
formats exist for exchange of information or reports; personal connections often compensate 
for this. On the other hand BS-donors are often not aware of programmes, projects or reports 
from non-BS donors. The type of information both groups receive seems to differ substantially 
and so does the interpretation given to it. While BS-donors are very lenient towards the GoR, 
INGO are most often extremely critical, at least behind closed doors, and non-budget support 
donors feel caught in the middle. The GoR is a strong actor and is indeed often backed – or at 
least not questioned by the friendly BS donors[57]. Non-BS-donors feel overruled by this united 
front. Their critical findings or concerns are often rejected as anecdotic and therefore invalid. 
Until now, a caricature of projects has often been drawn in a simple juxtaposition of projects 
and budget support. Obviously, projects can be much richer than the traditional project formats 
and new aid modalities are no panacea (Booth, 2005: 6). Instead of a dichotomy, a continuum 
of instruments is available. In addition, projects or more generally local presence may provide 
grassroot information and insight, imperceptible for Kigali headquarters. Donors indicate that 
MINALOC wants donors out at local level. Being barred from local and grassroot insight serves 
of course well a government that aims to uphold the Kigali window dressing. The donor divide 
strengthens the GoR in its power play up to an unhealthy level. Whereas a strong government is 
undoubtedly laudable, checks and balances remain crucial. These are currently completely lack-







legation	of “making a backwards step”.	They	consider	the	involvement	at	the	sectoral	level	beneficial	as	it	o.a. “helps to 
establish a closer link between resources and result”.		
[57]	 	See	Marriage	(2006)	for	the	case	of	Dfid.	
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3.5.3.	 Hands	off	“Independence”
One of the issues that is extremely difficult to discuss is the lack of independence. 
As discussed above independency is highly problematic in Rwanda. The room for independent 
research, evaluation or monitoring is rather narrow: civil society has its hands tied, institutes 
are restrained or restrain themselves, local authorities are controlled from above and local par-
ticipation is often understood as consciousness-raising. This situation hampers the application 
of the PRSP logic and paradigm that incorporates the need for independent M&E as source 
for evidence-based learning. A lack of voice and corresponding accountability weakens M&E. 
Rwanda has jumped into the PRSP process while building a strong civil society and incorporat-
ing participation is a slow process. Yet a process approach implies progress and it is undeniable 
that the key paradigm conditions are still fundamentally problematic at the eve of the second 
PRSP. When the process conditions are not fulfilled, the process cannot be assumed to unfold 
well and reach its expected outcomes. The international donor community is ambiguous when 
it concerns the lack of independence. On the one hand it is fully aware and shares the concern, 
understanding its undermining effects. On the other hand action is completely lacking. While 
donors provide funding to NGOs (national and international) and uphold a discourse of ‘further-
ing an enabling environment’ for civil society, on the ground, in Rwanda, there is not much evi-
dence to this effect[58]. They also do little cross-reading between the information they get from 
civil society and their own donor involvement. The EU for example financially supports several 
NGOs – full stop. There is no follow up of their findings or the difficulties they meet. Some donors 
explicitly state that the GoR is their partner; therefore they argue they cannot act against it[59]. 
They claim that sensitive issues, such as the lack of independency, are discussed with the GoR; 
they are integrated in the policy dialogue (see e.g. Purcell et al., 2006). As demonstrated below, 
we strongly believe that sensitive matters cannot be dealt with aggressively or disrespectfully. 
Yet, when policy dialogue is chosen as the way to deal with it, the effectiveness of the instrument 
deserves to be followed up. Otherwise the powerful instrument of policy dialogue risks to be 
reduced to mere discourse. We found donors not to take themselves or the GoR serious enough 
as such follow up is not undertaken. “Mutual accountability” is one of the new code words in the 
Memoranda of Understanding. Mutual accountability provides every reason to do serious follow 
up, also of policy dialogues. One of the strongest capacities of the GoR is its discourse, but prac-
tice should tag along discourse. While the GoR finds that aid is made dependent upon too many 
political conditionalities, nothing seems less true[60]. Dialogue remains the key word in all donor 
instances and withdrawal is never seriously considered and this while the overwhelming lack of 
independence is even affecting donors own room for independent M&E. Memoranda of Under-
standing of several donors or budget support performance criteria embrace improved democ-
racy and government accountability. But the sole incident that led to a delay of DFID’s disburse-





[59]	 	In	their	evaluation	of	the	2000-2005	Rwanda	Country	Programme,	Kanyarukiga	et	al.	(2006:	41)	refer	to “some 
respondents perceiving Dfid as being ‘a close friend of government that does not like civil society”.	Kanyarukiga	et	al.	(2006:	
vii)	indicate	that “while Dfid has good access to decision-makers and top-management in government, contacts and relation-
ships with civil society, the private sector and rural settings have been much less well developed”.	They	consider	this “a major 
challenge to Dfid Rwanda, particulary in a context of decentralised service delivery”.
[60]	 	For	example,	donors	have	even “maintained high levels of assistance after it became known that the new regime was 
actively perpetrating rebellion across the border in the Congo on a scale which went beyond mere self-defence” (Browne,	2007:	
17).	On	the	limited	enforcement	of	conditionalities	in	general,	see	Mokoro	ltd.	(2005).	
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were the military threats of Rwanda with regard to the DRC in 2004. Serious domestic political 
concerns – such as disappearances, unlawful detentions, arbitrary arrests, the overruling of the 
opposition party, false accusations - have never affected aid or disbursements[61]. This ‘hands 
off’ policy is largely shared by both budget-support and non-budget-support-donors. For exam-
ple USAID encountered huge problems with a civic education programme; it was ‘simply’ closed 
down without any further effect. Donors easily (or voluntarily) downsize their ambitions due to 
the Rwandan political opportunity structure. 
3.5.4.	 Hands	off	land
Land is an extremely important topic in Rwanda. The absence of a sound framework 
at MINITERE to follow up and eventually include evaluative analysis of the new land policy and 
law is worrisome. Although the new land law is still far from complete, monitoring and evalua-
tive exercises, e.g. type ‘ex-ante Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA)’ should already be 
taken on board from the beginning onwards. This is all the more true for a policy of such an 
importance to the country. After a long period of debate, the new land law[62] was adopted mid 
2005[63]. However, the land law creates almost as many lacunae as it tries to answer. While 
some matters, including the land commissions and bureaus which will have important roles in 
monitoring and reporting, have over time been legislated through decrees, many more decrees 
will be necessary before adequate implementation is possible and before the rule of law can gov-
ern land issues in the country. Not only land shortage, but also the particular history of Rwanda 
determines the complexity of the land issue. It is intertwined with several waves of refugees 
leaving and returning to the country, such as during and after the 1994 genocide. Land tenure 
and entitlements are vigorously debated in the hills of Rwanda. Land tenure is critical for sur-
vival, but also for the country’s and individuals’ economic position. The high need, the limited 
availability and the many alternating holders of land will most certainly lead to conflicts. The 
question is how many and intense they will be; how they will be channelled and solved. Several 
awareness-raising campaigns have given local authorities some understanding of the land law, 
which they seem to have started implementing. Given that many crucial decrees are still lacking, 
the land law implementation limps along. Since no sound M&E system is elaborated, follow up 
and evaluation becomes almost impossible at a later stage. Dfid currently runs a project with on 
the one hand a local study – which has to provide input for the many decrees to be adopted – and 
on the other hand decree drafters. It is remarkable that Dfid takes, again, the lead in this impor-
tant domain, while other donors seem surprisingly reluctant. Yet, all donors share the awareness 
of the importance and delicacy of land in Rwanda. Dfid’s engagement with land is constructive, 
yet it is doubtful whether such a limited investment of time and energy can adequately address 
such a complex set of issues. 
The combination of a lacking M&E path and the sole involvement of a friendly do-
nor, not too critical of government’s dealing with sensitive issues such as old and new refugees, 
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a cumbersome light on the future land policy. These sensitive complexities are unlikely to be 
mapped when there is no demand to do so. While ‘wrong’ and ‘right’ debates may add little con-
structively, differing perspectives enrich and strengthen M&E and ultimately policy and practice. 
Protectorates and fences are unlikely to contribute to evidence-based poverty reduction and 
inclusive[65] poverty policies. 
Apart from donors, NGOs are also absent as M&E actors (see also Wyss, 2006). 
LandNet was an active network during the development of the land policy[66], but it is now 
paralysed. Its relationship with Minitere seriously deteriorated on the basis of a seemingly dis-
proportionate reaction over the organisation of a conference. Also internally the network has 
more or less collapsed. For the moment, LandNet is not on top of things, so M&E can hardly be 
expected from it. This may, again, well serve those who do not want critical voices or watchdogs 
on the implementation of the land policy. 
3.5.5.	 Hands	off!	
Not only land and independence are sensitive issues, equally sensitive are arbitrary 
detentions, accusations of divisionism, disappearances, enrichment of the capital and its elite, 
inequalities, the genocide, the gacaca tribunals, the (non-)prosecution of RPF members, forged 
elections, uneven access to resources, abuses of local elites, the solidarity camps[67] etcetera. 
Both donors and the GoR prefer not to talk about these issues too loudly. The political opportu-
nity structure of Rwanda is not only about the GoR, but it is – as discussed above – codetermined 
by the presence of the international community in the country. Donors have their interests too in 
a partner country. Not only the GoR of Rwanda wants to convince bystanders that it is doing well, 
donors have a similar stake to display success, the success of the development enterprise. That is 
what they will be accounted for. From that point of view, the not-too-critical approach becomes 
understandable. Donors have an interest to demonstrate that things go well (see e.g. Marriage, 
2006). Even more, the lack of an open critical approach can be justifiable on the condition that 
the diplomatic way it is dealt with pays off, at least at some stage. The donor divide reinforces 
the self-sanctioning of donors in Rwanda. Non-budget support donors feel often marginalized, 
not taken seriously. This is – understandably – extremely frustrating and somehow they want 
to become part of the real donor life. Limiting the wind upfront may be a way to at least ease 
relationships with the high ranked players[68]. Apart from the institutional point of view of de-
velopment agencies, individual interest may also play a role in the hands off policy. Unlike NGOs, 
development agencies have to obey stricter rules of courtesy and diplomacy; inconsiderate jams 
may be judged unfit for the development career. The tag ‘undiplomatic’ will undoubtedly harm 
many individual careers within development agencies. Often, the noise made by donors fluctu-
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Donors will not be able until the end of times to ignore these crucial issues. They 
will return one day because policies that ignore the thorniest issues in society will not reach 
the poverty reduction goals. This means that – when the boomerang returns gently – policies 
will need to be revised. More unpleasant will be the day these issues backfire in the donor face. 
While donors prefer to stick to the technics of M&E at macro and input level, politics are carving 
down the limping system from within. 
4.	 esCAPIng	the	trAP
A distinction can be made between economic development and political develop-
ment. However, instead of representing two clear-cut categories, both should be considered as 
extremes of a continuum. In between economic development (e.g. macro-economic growth) 
and political development (multi-party system, open culture of debate) lies a large grey zone 
of mixed fields; fields where economic and political development are interlinked. Whereas the 
GoR demonstrates a high willingness when it comes to economic growth, it shows little sincere 
engagement for political progress. We argue that for the cause of poverty reduction, the ends of 
the continuum should not be the main focus of development agencies. They should rather try to 
move to the more challenging but crucial field of ‘in-between’ easy debatable economic growth 
on the one hand and untouchable political development issues on the other hand[69]. One of the 
key issues that reside within the ‘challenging in-between’ area is e.g. the degree of ‘inclusive-
ness/exclusiveness’ of economic development.
In what follows we argue that ‘smart M&E’ offers a powerful entry point for open-
ing up the ‘in-between’. It however necessitates a broadening of the fairly narrow and shallow 
approach towards M&E that is currently adopted, which emphasizes monitoring, inputs and 
data collection, while at the same time largely neglecting evaluative analysis, substance and its 
political “embeddedness”. In the previous sections we have shown how within this restricted 
vision upon M&E Rwanda is not doing too badly, on the contrary. Yet, we have also unveiled 
how the political opportunity structure heavily impinges upon various dimensions of M&E: its 
institutional set-up, its capacity, the choice of indicators and feedback. While the current ‘nar-
row’, ‘technocratic’ approach to M&E may be conceived ‘political neutral’ and the only one that 
is feasible, we have argued that politics are all around. A fragmentary M&E approach risks wors-
ening political constraints and may even put into perspective its overall technical soundness. It 
strengthens the monopoly of government M&E supply, lowers further down voice and accounta-
bility, hides and reinforces flaws in policies, which are particularly pernicious when they perpetu-
ate existing exclusionary practices. Inversely, ‘smart M&E’ acknowledges first and foremost the 
political and institutional embeddedness of M&E and adheres to the potential leverage of M&E 
on inclusive poverty reduction and the POS. It fully taps the role M&E could play in exploiting 
the ‘in-between’, bringing more ‘sensitive’ issues into the bargaining area and unveiling ‘con-
ceptual flaws’. In practice ‘smart M&E’ involves more emphasis on evaluative exercises, disag-
gregation, triangulation of data sources, the learning function of M&E and changing incentives 
for ‘independent’ actors at the M&E supply & demand side (lower costs and increasing benefits 
of data collection, analysis and usage). When assessing a country’s M&E system in the context 
of alignment efforts, it involves the adoption of diagnosis schemes that move beyond PFM and 
[69]	 	Gordillo	and	Andersson	(2004:	318)	however	argue	that “attitudes towards evaluation are unlikely to change without 
successively strengthening the institutions for equitable political participation and downward accountability”.	
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data collection and put M&E within the context of a country’s political opportunity structure. In 
what follows we focus on some of these ‘smart techniques’ and indicate how donors could better 
use the marginal room they do have. 
4.1.	 The	power	of	Disaggregation	and	Evaluative	Exercises	
One of the key issues that reside within the ‘in-between’ area is the degree of ‘in-
clusiveness/exclusiveness’ of economic development.  A powerful way to expose and avoid ‘ex-
clusive’ policies is to disaggregate alongside relevant categories through the entire policy cycle. 
Disaggregation in impact analysis may e.g. unveil that policies impact differentially upon various 
groups of individuals. Conversely, categories as ‘gender’, ‘age’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘geographical loca-
tion’ also determine take-off positions and the way individuals react to policy incentives. For 
policies to be effective different take-off positions of individuals need to be mapped and taken 
into account during policy-making, monitoring and evaluation (Prennushi et al., 2000). Using 
‘aggregates’ instead tends to hide differences and while this may be comfortable in the short run, 
it unavoidably leads to “ecological fallacy”[70] and ineffective policies and, it may, in the case of 
Rwanda, also lead to highly perverse effects. 
Which categories are most relevant obviously varies from country to country. Ac-
cording to Prennushi et al. (2000:111) “the decision on the level of disaggregation of indicators 
is as important as the choice of indicators itself”. The categories have to be acceptable of course. 
Urban-rural, income categories, gender and regions are internationally applied differentiations; 
it should therefore not be too difficult to include them in Rwandan M&E as well. While it is too 
early to judge the usage that will be made of the data collected, it is worth mentioning that the 
latest (December 2006) draft Poverty Update Report includes data disaggregated along these 
lines. With ethnicity things are different: it is officially banned and it is completely unacceptable 
to insert questions about ethnicity at the stage of data gathering. This does not mean that it can-
not be brought into the picture in a ‘smart’ and technical way (see also Stewart, 2006). Instead 
of questioning secondary school children on their ethnicity – which is unacceptable – questions 
on types and origins of scholarships can hardly be considered unacceptable. This may provide 
crucial information, not only about the FARG but also about the general accessibility of second-
ary schools across ethnic groups. 
While there is a general tendency in the context of PRSPs and GBS to focus on 
‘aggregates’, there are also, within the realm of PRSPs, new evaluative exercises, such as the 
Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA) that aim at examining the likely poverty and social 
impact of reforms upon different groups in society, particularly focusing on the poor and most 
vulnerable (see World Bank, 2003). The importance of PSIAs cannot be overemphasized in the 
context of countries that score well on input management and aggregate levels of economic 
development but that have potentially exclusionary poverty reduction policies and outcomes. 
Moreover, a principally correct policy can also be ineffective when factors prevent the transition 
from one level in the causal chain to another. By making the expected results chain explicit, PSIA 
helps in identifying (potentially killing) assumptions and risks, some of which might be political. 
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While the use of PSIAs has been on the rise since 2002, including a pilot exercise in Rwanda (see 
Hanmer and Hendrie, 2002), various sources[71] have pointed at the need for a more systematic 
usage and an exploration of the full potentials. In those cases where PSIA has been included, it 
has been disappointedly weak on social, political and institutional aspects of reforms. Further-
more, participation of local knowledge and experience has so far mainly been limited to data 
collection. Additionally, there is often a low degree of feedback in terms of information dissemi-
nation for accountability and integration of lessons-learned by policy-makers. A more in-depth 
involvement of the government M&E unit responsible for evaluative poverty analysis as well as 
local research institutes and local M&E networks in PSIA could contribute to a learning-by-do-
ing capacity building of a country’s M&E demand and supply side.   
4.2.	 Emphasize	the	‘learning’	function	of	M&E		
The fundamentals of the new development paradigm deserve to be implemented 
more rigorously. The principles of results-orientation, iterative learning and evidence-based 
policy-making are among the pillars of the new framework. Without it, things get rather shaky. 
Donor practices in Rwanda demonstrate that M&E is more seen as a side obligation, almost an 
annoyance and not as one of the fundamentals. The negligence of M&E is general however and 
is reflected in many PRSPs and APRs (see Holvoet and Renard, 2007). M&E is clearly too often 
considered as a threat, not as a constructive contribution. M&E is about learning and account-
ability. M&E is of course also a gradual and learning process in itself. This is all the more true 
in closed political opportunity structures as accountability is almost by definition problematic 
in these societies. Therefore we argue that in states with a non-enabling political opportunity 
structure more emphasis could be put on learning instead of on accountability[72]. However, the 
temporary downscaling of accountability can only be justified if learning is truly taken serious 
by all stakeholders involved. Both positive and negative elements are essential for learning. 
Exclusive effects of policies need to be unveiled. Side effects of well-intended policies have to 
be identified. Political elements are an integral part of society and need be taken into account 
when unravelling effects and impacts. Shutting them out will compromise learning for improved 
policy-making. When necessary, sincere learning has to lead to corrective actions. Therefore it is 
necessary for donor agencies to use the available room for manoeuvre in a smart way. Political 
dialogue without minimal standards and follow up fail the test of smartness. Each donor should 
make an analysis of what is, in the terminology of Bourdieu (1979), in the unreachable “doxa” -
the set of taken-for-granted unquestionable assumptions and orthodoxies- but also of what can 
be pulled out, in which way. This is not only a kick off exercise but should be a continuous process. 
In Rwanda we observed too high a readiness with donors to accept the vast doxa, encompassing 
all issues smelling slightly political. By focusing on the forward-looking aspect of M&E in terms 
of improving policies and poverty reduction, M&E in compromised political opportunity struc-
tures may offer new opportunities. Putting the emphasis on learning and evidence-based policy-
making would entail a more welcoming attitude towards data and analyses from independent 
M&E actors that provide insights into what works on the ground and what does not (see also 
Cordillo and Andersson, 2004: 318), as well as towards efforts of cross-reading between macro 
and micro-level data. This logical scenario stands in sharp contrast with the actual Rwandan 
[71]	 	See	among	others	BMZ/GTZ	(2004),	Hayes	(2005),	Gomes	and	Lawson	(2005).
[72]	 	Similarly,	Gordillo	and	Andersson	(2004:	318)	argue	that “for policy lessons to lead to policy actions, evaluations need 
to be viewed less as a mechanism for control and more as a tool for learning, and public policy needs to be viewed less as final 
prescriptions and more as experiments”.	
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situation where local analyses by independent sources are often hampered or laughed away as 
anecdotic and where so far macro-micro-linkages remain under-researched. Whereas donors 
obviously could play an important role in stimulating the learning function, even to the extent of 
drawing themselves conclusions from data at hand, it seems that so far they have substantially 
downscaled the accountability aspect, yet without the necessary compensation in terms of in-
creased learning. 
4.3.	 The	power	of	‘Diversity’	and	‘Triangulation’
As highlighted by GTZ/BMZ (2005), policy monitoring must be able to become un-
comfortable in order to be effective. In order to guard against potential blockades, it is advisable 
not to rely on a single chain for the supply, analysis and dissemination of information. Further-
more, for the general sake of validity of M&E findings and conclusions, triangulation of data 
emanating from various sources is essential (see e.g. Cook and Campbell, 1979). In short, there 
should remain room for counter-analyses and divergent opinions; it is often surprise, critique 
and divergence that generated knowledge in the past (see also Easterly, 2006). 
In the context of a JSR e.g. learning and accountability should be particularly 
stimulated through cross-reading among various sources of secondary data collection, includ-
ing those generated by the government and other stakeholders (including donors, beneficiaries, 
NGOs, research institutes, M&E networks) as well as the confrontation with new rounds of pri-
mary data collection. As argued above, cross-reading among sectoral and central government 
sources could be improved in the Rwandan context. Triangulation of data collected at various 
levels of a sector intervention is similarly important. In particular, exchange of information from 
project donors collected at the level of individuals projects (often conceived as experiments or 
pilot projects) and overall sector data contributes to learning and accountability. Information at 
the project level provides interesting reality-checks for policy- makers as well as for budget sup-
port donors who increasingly focus on the aggregate picture; cut off from local realities on the 
ground. Conversely, by participating in a JSR, non-BS-donors get access to sectoral performance 
information and insights into issues at stake at the overall sectoral level, which allows them to 
contextualise their own project M&E.   
In societies with closed POS, donors obviously have an important role in ensuring 
the presence and effective functioning of multiple channels of supply, analysis and dissemina-
tion of information. 
4.4.	 Changing	the	incentive	structure	for	independent	M&E	demand
	 and	supply
In the era of BS and particularly in societies with a weak political opportunity struc-
ture, the added value of independent M&E demand and supply actors and the need to take their 
contributions at heart, becomes all the more important. When the political opportunity struc-
ture does not correspond to the conditions of the new aid paradigm and the ideal circumstance 
for BS, policies stand high chances to derail. Yet, while BS-donors limit themselves more and 
more to headquarter offices in capitals, evidence about failures on the ground risks to go un-
noticed (see also Kanyarukia et al., 2006). As Booth (2005: 5) points out: “The easy notion that 
donors only have to back off from demanding accountability for aid funds in order for domestic 
accountability to flower in its place is unrealistic and unhistorical”. Supporting an enabling en-
vironment for independent actors is thus not at all contrary to the partnership idea with the 
The Denial of Politics in PRSP’s Monitoring and Evaluation 
Experiences From Rwanda42 • IOB Discussion PaPer 2008-02
government, at least not when it is sincerely engaging. 
At several instances we highlighted that at this moment independent M&E demand 
and supply is largely deficient in Rwanda. For civil society organisations, research institutes, 
the auditor general, M&E networks, parliamentarians, etc. benefits of information generation, 
analysis and dissemination do not outweigh the costs. Given the features of the current POS, the 
international donor community is strongest and best placed to tackle problems of independency, 
access to clean data and analysis, free distribution of research results, etcetera. Donors should 
put more efforts in guaranteeing the production of reliable data and analysis and support or-
ganisations and institutes that could provide them, not with the purpose of creating opposition 
to power but as critical input to improve policy. This is not only to the interest of donors but also 
to the interest of the GoR if it is sincerely committed to poverty reduction, not to mention the 
interest of the Rwandan poor.  
Currently, however, donors’ support is limited to financial support of NGOs, CBOs 
or research institutes, even to the extent of disregarding the data and analysis that is provided 
with the funding. While there is no univocal evidence about the degree to which donors use data 
from (inter)national independent actors in their decisions about aid allocations, there are cases 
where donors have been strongly influenced by such data. Information on governance issues 
provided the Ugandan Debt Network e.g. has fed into the decision of Dfid to cut back its budget 
support to the Ugandan government (Cordaid, 2005: 31). Obviously, by merely using the data 
from independent sources, donors already increase benefits for independent M&E supply actors. 
They could also bring independent actors or at least the outcomes of their analysis in joint M&E 
exercises, such as the JRs or the JSRs. 
Promoting networks among diverse independent M&E actors, and increasing in 
particular the ‘analytical’ capacity of local research institutes and NGOs is another means of 
changing the incentive structure. It is particularly the ownership of ‘information analysis’ rather 
than ‘information’ as such that generates ‘power’ (see also Robb, 1999). In the Rwandan con-
text, ‘twinning’[73] or the creation of linkages beyond the national boundaries with international 
experts and research institutes might be another way of increasing the room of manoeuvre. 
	5.	 ConClusIon
The realisation of the new aid paradigm’s principles of results-based budgeting and 
management, iterative learning and evidence-based priority setting and policy-making is de-
pendent upon the effective functioning of systems of information collection, analysis and feed-
back. Similarly, accountability for poverty reduction, which is central to the PRSP enterprise, is 
well-served by the establishment of a strong M&E system. 
So far however, donors as well as recipients have adopted an overly fragmentary 
approach to M&E. The focus has overwhelmingly been on the way recipients handle inputs; on 
monitoring, at the detriment of evaluative analysis; on statistical data collection and methodo-
logical issues, at the detriment of the more systemic and institutional issues. 
This paper has pointed at the fact that the ignorance of the political embedded-
ness of a country’s M&E system is an important flaw in the PRSP programme theory. The fact 
that politics are part and parcel of M&E has been acknowledged long before in the context of 
projects and programme evaluation. One may assume that with the move towards the secto-
[73]	 	‘Twinning’	is	the	creation	of	collaboration	between	organisations	with	similar	functions	but	with	different	levels	
of	‘development’.	See	e.g.	Cooper	(1984)	and	Jones	and	Blunt	(1999)	for	a	more	recent	discussion	on	‘twinning’.	
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ral and national level, stakeholders and interests are multiplied and politics thus all the more 
present. Therefore it is evident that the way in which politics influence M&E in the contemporary 
development paradigm should be high on the research agenda. 
While there have recently been some contributions that have pointed at the im-
portance of taking a broader perspective on M&E[74], so far there has been no research that 
explicitly identifies and explores the linkages between politics and M&E. This paper aims at fill-
ing this gap through combining insights from political theory and M&E theory and practice. The 
assessment framework established in this paper builds on the concept of Political Opportunity 
Structure (POS) and furthers the understanding of the relationship between powers and inter-
ests and various dimensions of M&E, including its institutional set-up, its capacity, its choice of 
indicators and its feedback. The central ideas of this paper are illustrated by case-study material 
from Rwanda, yet findings can be extrapolated to other settings. 
The Rwandan case highlights that persistent exclusion and denial of the importance 
and presence of political issues in M&E risks undermining both M&E’s functions of ‘accountabil-
ity’ and ‘feedback & learning’. While the current narrow and shallow approach towards M&E may 
be conceived ‘political neutral’ and the only one that is feasible, we have argued that a ‘politics 
blind’ approach may worsen political constraints and eventually even jeopardize M&E’s techni-
cal soundness. It strengthens the monopoly of government M&E supply, lowers further down 
voice and accountability, hides and reinforces flaws in policies, which are particularly pernicious 
when they perpetuate existing exclusionary practices. Conversely, ‘smart M&E’ acknowledges 
the political and institutional embeddedness of M&E and adheres to the potential leverage of 
M&E on inclusive poverty reduction and POS. Smart M&E fully taps the role M&E could play 
in bringing more sensitive issues into the bargaining area, shifting debates on a more factual 
basis, unveiling impacts on the ground, disentangling deficient implementation from inherent 
conceptual flaws in policies, and discriminating between ‘doing things right’ and ‘doing the right 
things’. Smart M&E at least encompasses more emphasis on evaluative exercises (type PSIA), 
disaggregation, triangulation of data sources. It underlines the learning function of M&E and 
seeks to change incentives for ‘independent’ actors of the M&E supply and demand side. When 
assessing a country’s M&E system in the context of alignment efforts, it involves the adoption 
of diagnostic schemes (such as the Kusek and Rist readiness assessment or the WB-PREM diag-
nostic tool ‘The Institutional Dimension of PRS Monitoring Systems’) that move beyond PFM 
and data collection and put M&E within the context of a country’s POS. It entails more donors 
that better use the marginal room they do have in the context of new aid modalities. Refraining 
from doing this may turn the Political Opportunity Structure into a killing assumption to the 
entire development enterprise under the PRSP framework. 
[74]	 	See	e.g.	Bedi	et	al.	(2006),	Kusek	and	Rist	(2004).
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